









The research seeks to gauge the global competitiveness of Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) financial markets. The assessment is made using quantitative 
and hybrid metrics of financial centre development while placing particular 
emphasis on competitiveness drivers relevant to the activity of global sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs) in the CEE region.
Besides an introduction, the study contains sections dealing with: research 
methodology and objectives; quantitative, quantitative and hybrid metrics 
of financial market competitiveness and their significance for investment 
by global SWFs in CEE as well as initiatives aimed at securities market 
consolidation in the region. The findings lead to conclusions regarding 
the allure of CEE financial industries to global SWFs. The stylized facts 
contained in the research are appended by case studies based on selective 
CEE listed financial markets for which comparable datasets have been 
available.
Despite continued progress, the financial centres of CEE remain marginal 
from the pan-European (let alone global) perspective. Their peripheral 
stance is a legacy of communism which has stifled free enterprise (including 
capital markets) for almost half a century. Another constraint relates to scale 
and expertise – the fragmented securities markets of CEE find it difficult to rival 
their seasoned Western peers bolstered by larger, robust economies and drawing 
on extensive hands-on experience.
From the viewpoint of a single financial centre, the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (WSE) stands out as the most diversified and liquid market, 
although its days as an independent entity might be numbered – amid 
a growing trend towards stock market consolidation. The stunted growth 
of CEE financial centres appears to be a major constraint in wooing global 
SWFs into the region. One of the remedies is consolidation via merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activity – already attempted under the auspices 
of the CEE Stock Exchange Group (CEESEG) and validated by close links 
(qualitative and quantitative) among CEE markets. Besides consolidating, 
the  CEE f inancia l markets should strive to  upgrade the  qua lity 
of socioeconomic environments in which their financial industries operate 
and to prioritize the advancement of technical and human infrastructure 
(prerequisites for attracting high-quality global investment institutions – 
including SWFs).
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3.1. Research methodology and objectives 
The methodology of the research combines the use of quantitative 
and qualitative competitiveness metrics. The former focus on trading 
magnitude and intensity in key market segments (equity, fixed income, 
financial derivatives), whereas the latter seek to synthetize instrumental 
factors (a selection of socioeconomic competitiveness rankings) and financial 
centre assessments (gleaned from external respondents). Numerous caveats 
should be attached to both approaches. They relate to the growing prominence 
of trading in over-the-counter (OTC) financial instruments (unaccounted 
for or underreported in official statistics), subjective biases in surveys (based 
on a sample of responses), misinterpretation of (positive or negative) synergies 
existing among the market segments, as well as idiosyncrasies affecting 
the activity of a single financial centre (difficult to benchmark across a peer 
group).
The ultimate objective of the study is to assess the “friendliness” 
of CEE financial centres to global SWF investments and to produce policy 
recommendations aimed at improving the investment climate of the CEE 
economies to global SWFs. Both goals have not been adequately addressed 
by scholars and policymakers to date – thus the study is a pioneering effort 
in this regard.
3.2. Quantitative drivers of a globally competitive 
financial centre 
Financial centres can be judged in multiple ways. Traditionally, their 
competitiveness has been assessed using metrics embodying the breadth 
(diversity, heterogeneity, product selection (cf. Michie, Oughton 2013) 
and depth (volume, liquidity, capacity, cf. Sarr, Lybek 2002) of trading 
activity. In line with such assumptions, a globally competitive financial centre 
should offer a rich and comprehensive selection of investment opportunities 
needed to construct an efficient portfolio (Choueifaty, Coignard 2008d) 
while on the other hand, it should maximize the likelihood of seamless 
trade execution (both goals are of paramount importance to SWFs whose 
investment holdings are bulky, dispersed globally, and increasingly diversified 
by asset class and financial instrument). Such an approach, although intuitive 
in interpretation and methodology, has a few serious practical drawbacks:
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• statistical misrepresentation: as  over-the-counter (OTC) (usually 
unregulated and  relatively opaque) markets gain traction in  global 
finance, the  magnitude of  their activity (vs. listed markets) can be 
understated due to information scarcity (Nystedt 2004) – this constraint 
is particularly relevant to emerging economies where the bulk of trading 
is done on an OTC basis (owing to the relative underdevelopment of local 
public exchanges);
• globalization: the competitiveness of a single financial centre is critical, 
however, in view of the rising degree of globalization it is by far more 
important how a local financial system can interact with and leverage 
the functionality of other centres (cf. Walter 1998) – such a reservation 
applies directly to  emerging markets whose socioeconomic progress 
is to a large extent a function of their openness to the external world;
• scale effects: small economies are at a clear disadvantage, as the broad 
infrastructure necessary to help nurture an internationally competitive 
financial centre is  so significant that  it  can disproportionately favour 
large countries (World Economic Forum 2016) –  this issue is  further 
complicated by  CEE’s ongoing integration with  the  European Union 
(itself commanding several globally competitive financial centres 
operating across national borders);
• synergies (classical and reverse): the sheer size of segments making up 
a financial centre does not account for their linkage and the collective 
value (created or destroyed) in  the process –  there is no single metric 
that would adequately capture investment activity in any of the market 
segments (furthermore –  their boundaries have blurred in  recent 
decades).
In view of such limitations, a quantitative analysis of financial centre 
competitiveness should, ideally, encompass all major investment asset 
classes (group of investments that display similar characteristics) and their 
specific metrics. Among asset types routinely used by institutional investors 
are categories considered traditional (equity, bonds, cash and cash equivalents) 
and those deemed alternative (all non-traditional investments including: 
natural resources, commodities, real estate, infrastructure, intellectual 
property, financial derivatives, structured products, artworks, antiques, 
collectibles as well as hedge, private equity- and exchange traded funds) (CAIA 
2016; Investopedia 2016).
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In practice, however, information disclosure standards prevalent 
internationally further restrict the selection to the following publicly tradable 
categories:
• equity (turnover, number of trades, market capitalization, and number 
of listings) – this category demonstrates the extent and quality of global 
investors’ commitment to  corporate co-ownership (which can imply 
active or passive strategies with regard to company stock);
• bonds (turnover, number of  trades, number of  listings) –  as  a  quasi-
lending form of financing, the scale of investments in debt instruments 
underlies the perception of investors as to a favourable interplay between 
yields and  creditworthiness with  regard to  corporate, municipal 
and sovereign debt;
• financial derivatives (notional turnover, number of contracts traded) – three 
major strategies predominate among investors in  financial derivatives: 
speculation (seeking capital gains via active risk taking), hedging 
(mitigating the risk of volatility in asset prices) and arbitrage (exploiting 
pricing inefficiencies for particular assets or their combinations).
In the SWF context, the aforementioned asset classes can be entered into 
directly or through financial intermediaries (i.e. other asset management 
institutions). No matter how convoluted the investment strategies employed, 
the proposed quantitative assessment offers a snapshot of the financial centres 
covered.
Appendices 3–8 contain the aforementioned metrics for selective CEE 
markets (the Bucharest Stock Exchange, the Bulgarian Stock Exchange 
– Sofia, the Budapest Stock Exchange, the Ljubljana Stock Exchange, 
the Prague Stock Exchange and the Warsaw Stock Exchange). The appendices 
contain quantitative data on the three major asset classes (market segments): 
equity, bonds and derivatives with further specifics on order handling 
routines (e.g. electronic or manual) and collective investment schemes (e.g. 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities, UCITS; 
Exchange Traded Funds, ETFs) used by the markets. The trading datasets 
also comprise information on market size, turnover and listing numbers 
for the specific segments covered. The following takeaways can be gleaned 
from the appendices:
• peripheral significance: despite lofty aspirations, the CEE market remain 
local in  their outreach and  are  struggling to  develop a  supranational 
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presence (internationalization of  capital flows, attracting foreign 
issuers, supplying complex, multipartite professional services)  – 
the  fragmentation of  CEE’s markets does not  seem to  be working 
to the region’s overall advantage;
• limited breadth and depth: the CEE economies have made great strides 
in cultivating their financial centres, yet most of them remain relatively 
undiversified and illiquid (the post-communist transition is lengthy) – 
additionally, the  region’s markets exhibit low penetration by  modern 
and  flourishing financial instruments (financial derivatives, ETFs 
and UCITS);
• consolidation: M&A activity is  afoot (e.g. CEESEG) to  improve 
the increasingly fragile economics of financial centres in the face of rising 
regulatory costs and rigor, falling fees as well as stiffening competition 
from non-CEE exchanges and multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) – 
consolidation among securities markets can occur both de jure (formal 
M&A alliances) and de facto (intense trading activity between or among 
individual markets);
• Warsaw’s pre-eminence: the  Warsaw Stock Exchange outranks 
the other CEE financial centres by most quantitative counts and exhibits 
unparalleled breadth of  activity (cf. Gál 2015) –  the  Polish bourse 
is  reaping scale-related and  first-mover advantages (the largest EU 
member in the CEE peer group and a CEE pioneer to have embraced 
a liberally mined “shock therapy”).
Judging by the quantitative metrics reviewed in this research, the CEE 
financial centres in general fail to deliver the diversity and liquidity necessary 
to accommodate large-scale investments of the world’s leading SWFs – whose 
assets for the top ten institutions range between US$ 236.0 billion and 847.6 
billion as at 30 April 2016 (SWFI 2016).
3.3. Qualitative and hybrid drivers of a globally 
competitive financial centre 
As previously mentioned, quantitative metrics of financial centre 
competitiveness based on the intensity of financial activity do not fully 
capture the holistic aspect of what underpins a globally recognizable 
financial environment. Usually, qualitative (or hybrid) competitiveness 
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drivers are incorporated to demonstrate a more comprehensive approach. 
Numerous variables make up such methodologies, yet their essence comes 
down to effective, albeit nonintrusive, regulations, ease of doing business 
and the existence of investment friendly social factors (Securities Industry 
Association 2008).
Open and fair financial markets with particular emphasis on legal remedies 
available to minority stockholders in the event of abuse, are of paramount 
importance as financial institutions, let alone individuals, usually play this role 
(cf. Rose 2014).
Free flow of capital and a convertible currency matter to financial investors 
as they facilitate effective investment repatriation by international institutions 
and individuals and help minimize transaction costs (cf. Odonnat 2008).
The availability of a skilled workforce and flexible labour laws help supply 
local talent and downsize hire/fire costs. It is noteworthy that emerging markets 
globally face a shortage of adequately trained staff while the complexity 
of financial products and services continues to grow. For some emerging 
markets it is possible to reclaim some of the foreign-educated talent to their 
own advantage (Giannetti, Liao 2013).
The use of a globally familiar language simplifies business interaction; 
clearly, countries where English serves as an official language or where 
it is widely spoken have an edge over those whose official tongue is of merely 
local or regional significance (Madden, Wan Nursofiza 2015).
A fair, transparent, efficient legal and regulatory regime, on the one hand, 
offering remedies in the event of contractual breaches, while, on the other hand, 
not materially distorting commercial activity, sets the stage for a predictable 
and well-oiled corporate governance environment.
Not only do sound and fair tax levies represent a sizable cost of doing 
business, yet the need to mollify a fickle fiscal regime results in risk exposure 
which is difficult to quantify, mitigate and can undermine commercial 
rationalism. With the leeway existing in the European Union regarding national 
tax systems, fiscal competition plays a particularly vital role.
Implementation of international standards and best practices (e.g. IOSCO 
and BIS): in an era of rising corporate, social responsibility and transparency 
shows the extent to which financial institutions and sectors are able 




A low cost of doing business (minimal “red tape” and bureaucratic inertia, 
etc.) helps preserve a healthy balance between requisite regulatory rigour 
and friendliness to businesses and businesspeople.
Although standards of technical infrastructure only indirectly affect 
financial businesses and individuals, they can often prove decisive in decisions 
to undertake or maintain financial activity in a given locality. Besides any 
infrastructural improvement needs lasting financial commitments which 
is hardly achievable by emerging economies.
Any volatility in government political and economic decision-making 
complicates current and future activity in the financial space, especially if such 
decision-making strays from rationality. That is precisely why the political 
environment of financial markets ranks atop of the competitiveness criteria 
vital for global supremacy among such centres.
Although valuable insights can be derived from a cross-sectional 
analysis of quantitative measures showing financial competitiveness, 
there is infinitely more to the competitive power of a financial centre 
than the sheer scale of its business. In practical terms, some centres can 
be viewed less favourably than their proven financial fundamentals, 
while some can punch far above their weight. This phenomenon tells us 
that competitive factors surrounding a financial centre are often difficult 
to categorize and quantify. Arguably, the Global Financial Centres Index 
(GFCI) pioneered by the British think tank Z/Yen (Z/Yen 2015) stands out 
as the most comprehensive and advanced way of integrating quantitative 
and qualitative competitive factors into a synthetic metric of financial centre 
competitiveness.
The GFCI’s methodology is based on a “factor assessment model” that uses 
two distinct sets of input (Z/Yen 2015):
• “instrumental factors: objective evidence of  competitiveness was 
sought from  a  wide variety of  comparable sources. For  example, 
evidence about a  just and reliable business environment was drawn 
from  a  corruption perception index (supplied by  Transparency 
International), an  ease of  doing business index (from the  World 
Bank) and an operational risk rating (from the EIU). A total of 105 
instrumental factors were used in GFCI 16. And all financial centres 
are represented in all the external sources, and the statistical model 
takes account of these gaps.
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• financial centre assessments: by  means of  an  online questionnaire, 
running continuously since 2007. In  GFCI 16, 29,226 financial centre 
assessments were drawn from 3,633 respondents.”
It is noteworthy that several CEE financial centres were ignored 
by the GFCI for a variety of reasons (the most important of them are limited 
institutional transparency and  inadequate statistical signif icance 
– a function of negligible impact on worldwide financial markets). The six 
CEE markets making up GFCI 16 comprised: Prague (the Czech Republic), 
Warsaw (Poland), St. Petersburg and Moscow (Russia), Budapest (Hungary), 
and Tallinn (Estonia).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the fortunes of the selected CEE emerging markets 
throughout the surveyed period (March 2007–September 2014), which 
corresponds to the 16 editions of the study. Several conclusions can be drawn 
from the trajectory of competitiveness for the CEE financial markets, however, 
among the most striking features are:
• intra-CEE correlations: all the  CEE financial centres under survey 
demonstrate an  astonishing degree of  correlation, which argues 
for  homogeneity in  the  approach to  the  region from  the  perspective 
of  financial industry competitiveness –  despite disparate tempos 
of macroeconomic growth and convergence with more established EU 
members, most CEE economies continue to  be put in  the  “emerging 
Europe” investment basket (MSCI 2016);
• high volatility (especially mid-crisis): the CEE financial centres exhibit 
heightened risk (measured by GFCI score volatility), which spiked far 
above the  worldwide GFCI average during the  global financial crisis 
of 2007–2009 (cf. Kern 2010) –  the CEE emerging economies are  still 
viewed as risky bets and in times of global economic turbulence suffer 
a flight of speculative capital (Kurnyaeva 2012);
• role of non-quantitative (“soft”) factors: as with other global financial 
centres, quantitative drivers of  financial centre competitiveness only 
partially explain the  standings of  individual centres, as  qualitative 
determinants play a pivotal role (Bourse Consult 2013) – e.g. Warsaw’s 
rankings are held back by such factors – many CEE economies continue 
to benefit from sustained investments in diverse elements of technical 
and human infrastructure accomplished in the communist era and their 
subsequent commercialization following the fall of communism;
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• global underperformance: despite ongoing convergence with  modern 
financial industries worldwide, CEE GFCI scores are still lagging behind 
the global average, which is a legacy of backwardness from the communist 
era and the high tempo of growth by financial capitalism globally (often 
labelled as “financialization”).
Figure 3.1. Global Financial Centre Index (GFCI) Scores for: Prague, St. Petersburg, Budapest, Moscow, 
Tallinn and the Average (worldwide) GFCI Score for March 2007 (GFCI 1)–September 2014 (GFCI 16) 
Source: Long Finance website (the GFCI Over Time online interface): http://www.longfinance.net/
programmes/financial-centre-futures/gfcigraph.html [accessed: 1.09.2015]. Note: GFCI Editions 1–16 
covered the 84 most representative financial centres worldwide.
3.4. The competitiveness of CEE financial centres 
and its significance for SWF investment activity 
Given the limited clout of the existing Russian SWFs in global terms (US$ 
152.20 bn of aggregate assets under management shared among three funds, 
thereby representing 2.09% of the global SWF asset total as of April 2016) 
and their recent self-absorption (the SWFs have been compelled to prop up 
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imposed after the Russian military intervention in Ukraine), the activity 
of global SWFs in CEE can be narrowed to foreign i.e. non-CEE SWFs’ 
investment allocations to the region. Therefore, CEE’s ability to offer a globally 
competitive socioeconomic environment is instrumental in wooing further 
inward investment by SWFs into CEE.
In this context, it is worth revisiting the hallmarks of SWFs investment 
activity:
• scale: SWFs top the  rankings of  global alternative investment 
institutions by assets under management – followed by private equity-, 
exchange traded-, and hedge funds (Bardalai et al. 2015), as such they 
have to allocate their portfolios in a way that would safeguard enough 
liquidity to accommodate large-scale transactions;
• long-termism: SWFs are  long-term investors whose competitive edge 
lies in  their ability to  wait out protracted macroeconomic cyclicality 
in  the  pricing of  asset classes (Bolton et  al.  2012) –  this trait implies 
exposure to  macroeconomic and  political risks in  the  host countries 
and the need to mitigate them (through pre-transaction due diligence 
and hands-on portfolio management);
• diversification: in an era of soaring inter- and  intra-asset correlations, 
SWFs need to  diversify their investment portfolios more vigorously 
across an ever broader array of asset classes and individual instruments 
(Aït-Sahalia, Xiu 2015) –  this necessity sways SWFs towards financial 
markets offering sufficient investment variety;
• risk adjusted efficiency: as the current yields of fixed-income instruments 
are at record lows and the outlook for other (traditional and alternative) 
asset classes remains mixed, SWFs are increasingly inclined to pursue 
investments providing a favourable risk/reward mix (Wiśniewski 2015) – 
this pursuit is  even more important for  fuel-based SWFs (squeezed 
by the price erosion of their exports).
It is to what extent the CEE financial markets are able to deliver on these 
priorities related to the activity of global SWFs that will determine the future 




3.5. CEE Stock Exchange Group as an example 
of business amalgamation 
The CEE Stock Exchange Group (CEESEG) is a holding company currently 
comprising the stock exchanges of Vienna (Austria) and Prague (Czechia). 
The holding company, emerged as the outcome of business combinations of CEE 
stock exchanges by the Vienna Stock Exchange after the collapse of communism 
in CEE. The group is the largest stock exchange alliance to emerge thus far in all 
CEE and its strategy is aimed at deriving regional synergies from the individual 
CEE markets (whose independent expansion might be hampered by scale-
related constraints). Among synergies envisaged as part of the consolidation 
drive is the home-market principle whereby the needs of small and medium 
capitalization issuers are best met by local exchanges.
While each member continues to support its local market under independent 
management, at the international level, the alliance acts as CEE Stock Exchange 
Group v all major professional market participants (which provides more 
bargaining power in cost negotiations). Additionally, both CEESEG members 
are engaged in numerous initiatives to raise the visibility of the alliance 
and to attract the attention of institutional investors, trading participants, data 
vendors and index licensees to CEE. Both exchanges profit from close cooperation 
and know-how transfers as well as from joint coverage of the CEE region.
The bipartite bloc has emerged as a result of complex M&A activity 
in CEE. In 2015, CEESEG adapted its business model to the changed market 
environment and disposed of its former stakes in the Budapest and Ljubljana 
stock exchanges. In order to ensure sustainable competitiveness, the group 
decided to shift from direct investment to co-operation in data vending, index 
licensing and information technology services spanning twelve other stock 
exchanges in CEE. These synergy effects and the common brand make it possible 
for the local markets to enhance networking with international customers.
3.6. CEE financial centres’ reform agenda 
Plenty needs to be done to upgrade the economic environments in which 
the CEE financial industries operate. Such reforms need to embrace both aspects 
directly relevant to the process of allocating investments and broader settings 
of the financial marketplaces. Among the reform initiatives that would help 
57
The Competitiveness of Central and Eastern European (CEE) Financial Markets
to raise the competitiveness of the CEE financial centres are: smart deregulation, 
globalization, improvements in infrastructure and a stronger domestic capital base.
The CEE financial industries have been erected on the ashes of communism, 
however, vestiges of the command economy linger on (they are usually tied 
to state interventionism) – the CEE financial jurisdictions should strike 
a delicate balance between the need to safeguard a responsible and transparent 
doing-business environment and much-needed liberalization. A gentle, yet 
persuasive regulatory touch appears to be the answer.
The CEE economies and financial industries would benefit enormously 
from increased exposure to global capital f lows – this can be achieved via 
deregulation and openness to foreign capital (both of which are hallmarks 
of intense globalization).
Despite an extended payback, advanced infrastructure is a sine qua non 
for developing an internationally competitive financial centre – infrastructural 
investments are exceptionally cumbersome for emerging markets whose 
budgets often operate on a shoestring, however, lasting and material 
commitments to this area are considered particularly beneficial for the breadth 
and depth of financial markets.
Finally, the strength of domestic financial institutions determines financial 
market stability in the event of foreign capital flight and helps reduce market 
volatility (systemic risks). This is the reason why even globally minded 
financial centres need to nurture their home capital base – not only to provide 
easily accessible investment opportunities to local clients, but also to render 
the domestic financial market more competitive in risk-adjusted terms.
Conclusions 
Despite brisk expansion, successful restructuring and ongoing convergence 
with developed European countries, the financial markets of CEE continue 
to trail their more experienced European peers. Besides the lingering legacy 
of communism, the CEE financial industries face other serious challenges 
related to limited scale, inadequate globalization, lack of domestic financial 
resources and institutions as well as obsolete infrastructure.
These weaknesses constrict the potential for more SWF investment 
in the region. SWFs, as the most powerful player among alternative asset 
managers, seek efficient, abundant and liquid capital markets to accommodate 
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their increasingly sizable and diversified portfolios. Given the interdependence 
of global financial markets, investment exposure to CEE investment assets 
can be developed indirectly: using more advanced financial centres, which 
is the case for most SWFs involved in CEE.
To overcome such constraints and attract a high-quality, value-adding 
institutional investor base (including a more conspicuous SWF presence), 
the CEE financial centres need to work out strategies consistent with national 
priorities, which will help ensure the commitment to and continuity of further 
socioeconomic reforms.
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